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Abstract
In case of multiple creditors a coordination problem can arise when the borrowing
firm runs into financial distress. Even if the project’s value at maturity is enough
to pay all creditors in full, some creditors may be tempted to foreclose on their
loans. We develop a model of creditor coordination where a large creditor moves
before a continuum of small creditors, and analyze the signalling effects of the large
creditor’s investment decision on the subsequent behavior of the small creditors. The
signalling effects crucially depend on the relative size of the large creditor and the
relative precision of information. We derive conditions under which pure herding
behavior is to be expected.
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21 Introduction
If multiple creditors are financing an investment project a coordination problem can
arise when the borrowing firm runs into financial distress. Even if the project’s
value at maturity is enough to pay all the creditors in full, some creditors may be
tempted to foreclose on their loans, fearing analogous behavior by other creditors.
Such coordination failure among creditors has been recognized as one of the main
causes of recent financial crises (see, e.g. Radelet and Sachs 1998, Fischer 1999).
Despite its empirical relevance, the issue has hardly been addressed in financial mar-
ket literature, since coordination problems lead to multiple equilibria if creditors are
perfectly informed. By applying the equilibrium selection framework of global games
as introduced by Carlsson and van Damme (1993a,b), Morris and Shin (2004) have
developed a basic model which uniquely determines the incidence of inefficient liqui-
dation due to creditor coordination failure. As is well known in the theory of global
games, a single large player can crucially change the equilibrium behavior of the
other small players.1 Takeda (2003) has therefore extended the global-game model
of creditor coordination by introducing a large player who decides simultaneously
with a continuum of small players on whether to foreclose on the loans or not.
In this paper, we modify the global-game approach of Morris and Shin (2004) in
order to analyze the signalling effects of a large player. As opposed to simultaneous
decisions of creditors, we assume that a continuum of small lenders takes into ac-
count the observable decision of the large creditor who moves first. This extended
model enables us to analyze the large creditor’s signalling effects. It turns out that
the influence of the signalling ability crucially depends on the relative size of the
large player and the relative precision of creditor information. Even a relatively
uninformed large creditor, who has no valuable information to signal, can affect the
liquidation result, but only inasmuch as his size is relevant. If size is negligible our
results coincide with those derived by Morris and Shin (2004). If the large creditor
is much better informed than the small creditors, a herding effect occurs whereby
the small lenders follow the large creditor’s behavior blindly, regardless of their own
private information.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set up the model and solve for
the equilibrium in the two limiting cases where the large creditor is infinitely better
or worse informed than the small creditors. Implications for the efficient creditor
structure are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 compares our results with those
1 Corsetti et al. (2004) have recently analyzed the role of a large player in the context of currency
attacks.
3derived by Takeda (2003) to emphasize the signalling effects of the large creditor.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
A large creditor and a continuum of ex ante identical small creditors are financing
a firm’s investment project. The proportion of loans financed by the large creditor
is λ ∈ [0, 1], while the investment of every small creditor is negligible. However, the
combined mass of loans financed by small creditors amounts to (1−λ). The project’s
profitability is uncertain before maturity. If the project succeeds, the firm remains in
operation and is able to pay back the full face value of a loan, normalized to unity, to
the creditors. Otherwise the firm is forced into bankruptcy and the creditors receive
no liquidation value. Before the project matures, creditors have the right to review
their investment, i.e. to decide whether to roll over their loans or to foreclose. In
the event of premature foreclosure a creditor receives the collateral κ ∈ (0, 1) per
loan. We assume that neither the collateral κ nor the value v of a loan at maturity
depends on the timing of the lenders’ investment decision. Creditors who postpone
their decision are able to react on the choices of the first-move lenders. Thus, a
creditor can either learn from the decisions of the predecessors, or he can use the
own investment decision to signal to the subsequent lenders. As usual in modern
global-game theory, it is assumed that the small creditors ignore the signalling effects
of their decisions.
Whether the project succeeds or fails depends on the underlying fundamental state
θ ∈ R of the firm. These fundamentals can be interpreted as a measure of the firm’s
ability to meet short-term claims from creditors. Let ` ∈ [0, 1] denote the proportion
of loans that are foreclosed. If the total incidence of foreclosure ` is greater than
θ, the firm is forced into bankruptcy. Otherwise, the project proceeds successfully.
Then the firm is able to pay back the loan proportions to the remaining creditors.
Thus, the value of the loans at maturity is given by
v(θ, `) =
1 if ` ≤ θ0 if ` > θ .
For convenience, we assume that if rolling over a loan yields the same expected
payoff as premature foreclosure, a creditor prefers to stop lending.
If creditors know the fundamental state perfectly before reviewing their investment,
the optimal investment strategies depending on θ can be analyzed as follows. For
4good fundamentals θ ≥ 1, the dominant strategy for any creditor is to continue lend-
ing since the project succeeds even if all other lenders prematurely foreclose on their
loans. On the contrary, bad fundamentals θ < 0 imply that premature foreclosure
is optimal for every creditor, irrespective of the decisions of the other lenders. The
interesting range is the intermediate case with 0 ≤ θ < 1. A coordination problem
among the lenders occurs since the optimal investment decision of each creditor de-
pends on the behavior of the others. If all other creditors stop lending, the expected
payoff to rolling over is 0, so that foreclosing on the loan is the optimal decision.
Otherwise, if everyone else continues lending, the payoff is 1, so that rolling over
the loans is the dominant strategy. Thus, under complete information there are two
pure-strategy Nash equilibria, foreclose and roll over. In addition, there exists a
mixed-strategy equilibrium if θ ∈ [0, 1), such that a creditor’s optimal strategy is to
foreclose on the loans with probability ` = θ.
The coordination problem among creditors can be resolved by the assumption of
incomplete information of fundamentals. In their seminal paper, Morris and Shin
(2004) analyzed the investment decisions of small creditors possessing uncertain
public and private information on the fundamentals. In the present paper, we follow
Takeda (2003) and drop the assumption that information on the fundamental state
θ is publicly available to creditors by assuming an improper uniform prior in R.
However, the lenders receive private signals regarding the fundamental state before
reviewing their investment. The large creditor observes the realization of the noisy
signal
y = θ + τη , (1)
where τ > 0 is a scale factor, indicating the amount of noise, and η is a random vari-
able with mean 0, continuously differentiable symmetric density g(·), and cumulative
density G(·). Equivalently, a small creditor i receives the private signal
xi = θ + σεi , (2)
with the scale factor σ > 0. The random variable εi is distributed with mean 0,
smooth symmetric density f(·), and cumulative density F (·). εi is i.i.d. across
creditors and is independent of the disturbance η. Each creditor deduces his own
estimate of θ, the distribution of signals reaching the other creditors, as well as their
estimates of θ from his private information.
52.1 The benchmark cases
To set a benchmark for the signalling effects we first solve the model for the case
where all creditors are small (λ = 0). This case corresponds to the simultaneous-
move game of Morris and Shin (2004) with an improper uniform prior if F is specified
by the c.d.f. of the standard normal distribution. In solving for the equilibrium, we
confine our attention to switching strategies, i.e. we consider strategies such that a
creditor’s investment decision solely depends on whether his private signal lies be-
low or above a certain threshold. As can be shown, this restriction is made without
loss of generality, since the presumed switching strategies are the only strategies
surviving the iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Thus, the trig-
ger equilibrium derived below turns out to be the unique Nash equilibrium. This
equilibrium is characterized by the critical value of the fundamentals θ∗ below which
the project fails, and a critical value of the signal x∗ such that creditors receiving a
lower signal will foreclose on the loans. The probability that any particular creditor
receives a signal below this critical level is
Pr (xi ≤ x∗|θ) = F
(
x∗ − θ
σ
)
which equals the proportion of creditors ` foreclosing on their loans. Thus, the
critical mass condition `∗ = θ∗ for the project to succeed is given by
θ∗ = F
(
x∗ − θ∗
σ
)
. (3)
A creditor, receiving the private signal xi, expects the project to succeed with prob-
ability
Pr (θ ≥ θ∗|xi) = F
(
xi − θ∗
σ
)
,
and hence rolls over his loan if his expected payoff is at least as high as κ. Thus,
the optimal cutoff condition for x∗ is given by
F
(
x∗ − θ∗
σ
)
= κ . (4)
Solving for the equilibrium by using (3) and (4) yields
x∗ = κ+ σF−1(κ)
θ∗ = κ
6Thus, the project will be inefficiently liquidated if the fundamental state is low with
θ ∈ [0, κ). In the opposite extreme case in which there is only one large creditor
(λ = 1) the game reduces to a simple decision problem. This creditor is able to
guarantee a successful completion of the project whenever θ ≥ 0. Having received
the private signal y, his expected payoff to rolling over a loan is given by
Pr (θ ≥ 0|y) = G
(y
τ
)
.
The critical signal y∗ that makes the large lender indifferent between continued
lending and foreclosure is therefore defined by the cutoff condition:
G
(
y∗
τ
)
= κ ,
so that
y∗ = τG−1(κ) .
The single large creditor forecloses on the loan if he receives a bad signal y ≤ y∗.
2.2 The signalling case
In the following, we consider the more interesting case in which the project is financed
by a single large creditor and a continuum of small creditors, i.e. λ ∈ (0, 1). As
argued by Corsetti et al. (2004) within a similar game-theoretic context, the small
players prefer delaying their decision while the large player benefits from signalling
and thus moves first. Since small creditors do not take into account the signalling
effects of their decisions, they have no incentive to make their investment decision
first. However, they might benefit from waiting, since they can observe the behavior
of the large creditor and learn more about the fundamental state θ if the large lender
moves first. Thus, it is a weakly dominant strategy for the small creditors to delay
the decision on whether to foreclose on their loans or not. Since the large creditor
anticipates the timing of the small creditors’ investment decisions, he is aware that in
equilibrium he can never learn from their choices. But he knows that he will send a
signal to the small creditors if he decides first. Since the large creditor is concerned
with coordinating his decision with those of the continuum of small lenders, he
benefits from moving first and signalling his decision to these small creditors. Thus,
it is a dominant strategy for the large creditor to stop lending immediately, if he is
ever going to foreclose on his loans.
7In this sequential-move game a unique trigger equilibrium exists which is charac-
terized by the 5-tuple (y∗, x∗, x∗, θ∗, θ
∗
). The large creditor, moving first, decides to
roll over the loan if his private signal y is greater than the switching point y∗. If the
small lenders observe the large creditor rolling over the loan, they will also decide
to continue lending as long as their private signal xi exceeds the threshold x
∗. But
even if the large creditor decides to foreclose on his loan, high signals xi > x
∗ make
the small creditors confident of the project’s success and entice them to continue
lending. Since x∗ < x∗ and since the private signals are correlated with the true
fundamental state θ, there exist threshold values θ∗ and θ
∗
corresponding to the
respective switching points x∗ and x∗. Failure of the project can always be averted
if fundamentals are sound, θ ≥ θ∗, but never if θ < θ∗. In the intermediate range
θ∗ ≤ θ < θ∗, the project’s success depends entirely on the large creditor’s investment
decision. Thus, in equilibrium the incidence of inefficient liquidation is uniquely de-
termined by the interval [0, θ∗) and [0, θ
∗
), respectively, depending on whether the
large creditor continues lending or not. Below, we derive conditions that jointly
determine the switching points y∗, x∗, x∗, θ∗, θ
∗
.
Having received the signal y, the large creditor’s expected payoff to rolling over a
loan is given by
Pr (θ ≥ θ∗|y) = G
(
y − θ∗
τ
)
.
Therefore, the critical signal y∗ is defined by the large lender’s cutoff condition
G
(
y∗ − θ∗
τ
)
= κ ,
so that
y∗ = θ∗ + τG−1(κ) . (5)
A low signal y ≤ y∗ leads the large creditor to stop lending. Then the switching
point x∗ of a small creditor i is implicitly given by his indifference condition
Pr (θ ≥ θ∗ | y ≤ y∗, xi = x∗) = κ , (6)
if a solution to (6) exists. If the probability on the LHS is strictly larger than κ
for all xi, x
∗ converges to −∞. Conversely, if the LHS is strictly smaller than the
RHS, irrespective of the private signals xi, the critical signal x
∗ tends to ∞. Since
the large creditor stops lending, the proportion of loans rolled over until maturity
8amounts to (1 − λ)Pr (xi > x∗|θ), so that in equilibrium the threshold θ∗ of the
fundamentals solves the critical mass condition
θ
∗
= 1− (1− λ)Pr (xi > x∗|θ = θ∗) . (7)
If the large creditor observes y > y∗, he sends an encouraging signal to the small
lenders. Consequently, they prefer rolling over their loans for a larger range of sig-
nals. The private signal x∗ that makes a small creditor indifferent between premature
foreclosure and continued lending in this case is given by
Pr(θ ≥ θ∗|y > y∗, xi = x∗) = κ , (8)
if a solution to (8) exists. Otherwise, x∗ → −∞, if the LHS is strictly larger than
κ for all xi. If κ exceeds the probability on the LHS for all xi, x
∗ → ∞. The
corresponding threshold value θ∗ of the fundamentals, below which stopped lending
by small creditors alone is sufficient for the project to fail, solves
θ∗ = 1− λ− (1− λ)Pr(xi > x∗|θ = θ∗) . (9)
To derive the equilibrium thresholds, the equations (5) to (9) have to be solved
simultaneously. From (1) and (2), the private signal of the large creditor can be
rewritten as
y = xi + τη − σεi . (10)
Using the equations (5) and (10), a small creditor’s posterior probability assessment
of the project’s success conditional on the signal xi and observing the large creditor
continuing lending can be expressed as
Pr (θ ≥ θ∗ | y > y∗, xi) = Pr(xi − σεi ≥ θ∗ | xi + τη − σεi > θ∗ + τG−1(κ))
= Pr
(
εi ≤ xi − θ
∗
σ
∣∣∣∣ τη − σεi > θ∗ − xi + τG−1(κ)) .
Thus, the critical signal x∗ can be derived by solving
Pr (θ ≥ θ∗ | y > y∗, xi = x∗) = Pr(θ ≥ θ
∗, y > y∗, xi = x∗)
Pr(y > y∗, xi = x∗)
=
Pr
(
εi ≤ x∗−θ∗σ , τη − σεi > θ∗ − x∗ + τG−1(κ)
)
Pr (τη − σεi > θ∗ − x∗ + τG−1(κ)) = κ . (11)
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which the large creditor has foreclosed on his loan:
Pr (θ ≥ θ∗ | y ≤ y∗, xi = x∗) = Pr(θ ≥ θ
∗
, y ≤ y∗, xi = x∗)
Pr(y ≤ y∗, xi = x∗)
=
Pr
(
εi ≤ x∗−θ
∗
σ
, τη − σεi ≤ θ∗ − x∗ + τG−1(κ)
)
Pr
(
τη − σεi ≤ θ∗ − x∗ + τG−1(κ)
) = κ . (12)
Neither of these equations can be solved explicitly in the general case, without
making further parametric assumptions on the distribution of the error terms η and
εi. Therefore, we follow the procedure suggested by Corsetti et al. (2004) and
confine our analysis to the limiting properties of the equilibrium to accentuate the
significance of information precision. In particular, we consider the limiting cases in
which the large creditor is much better and worse informed than the small lenders,
respectively.
If the large creditor’s private information is infinitely more volatile than the small
creditors’ information (σ/τ → 0), the equilibrium behavior of lenders can be sum-
marized by the following proposition.
Proposition 1: As σ/τ → 0, there is a unique trigger equilibrium with
y∗ = κ(1− λ) + τG−1(κ)
x∗ = κ(1− λ) + σF−1(κ)
x∗ = κ(1− λ) + λ+ σF−1(κ)
θ∗ = κ(1− λ)
θ
∗
= κ(1− λ) + λ .
Proof. See the Appendix.
This proposition implies that even an infinitely worse informed large creditor affects
the small creditors’ behavior by signalling his investment decision. Since the small
creditors’ information is much more precise, the signal of the large lender can not
reduce their uncertainty about the fundamental state θ. However, the observable ac-
tion of the large creditor reduces the strategic uncertainty of small lenders, i.e. their
uncertainty regarding the decisions of other creditors. Consequently, the equilibrium
outcome of the game is merely affected by the size of the large lender. According
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to ∂(θ
∗ − θ∗)/∂λ > 0, the large creditor’s influence on the project’s success or fail-
ure is strictly increasing in λ. As λ → 1, the coordination failure among creditors
vanishes as in the case where the project is financed by a single creditor. On the
contrary, if the large creditor’s investment volume becomes negligible (λ → 0), the
small creditors’ strategic uncertainty does not decrease. In this case, the critical
thresholds θ∗ and θ
∗
converge to κ as in the case with small lenders only. Thus, the
two benchmark models described in section 2.1 are limiting cases of the sequential
move game with both small and large creditors where the large creditor does not
possess any informational signalling ability.
These results change distinctively in the opposite and more evident extreme case of a
relatively better informed large creditor (σ/τ →∞). The creditors’ switching points
and the corresponding threshold values of the fundamentals can be summarized as
follows:
Proposition 2: As σ/τ →∞, there is a unique trigger equilibrium with
y∗ = τG−1(κ)
x∗ → −∞
x∗ →∞
θ∗ = 0
θ
∗
= 1 .
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 2 states that an infinitely better informed large creditor can exert much
more influence on the small creditor’s investment decisions than in the case with
σ/τ → 0. The large creditor does not only reduce the strategic uncertainty but also
eliminates the small creditors’ fundamental uncertainty by signalling his investment
decision. Actually, since the switching points x∗ and x∗ tend to −∞ and ∞, re-
spectively, small creditors imitate the decision of the better informed large creditor
irrespective of their own private signals. Since the large creditor anticipates that
in equilibrium the second movers will follow him blindly, he acts as if he was the
only lender. Thus, the equilibrium outcome of the sequential-move game with an
arbitrarily better informed large creditor corresponds to the benchmark case with
a single lender. Note that this result holds regardless of the size of the large credi-
tor. Even the informational signalling ability of an entirely insignificant large lender
(λ→ 0) generates such herding behavior among the small creditors.
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3 Implications on the efficient creditor structure
Having established that θ∗ ∈ (0, κ) and θ∗ ∈ (κ, 1) in the event of a large creditor
signalling to a continuum of small creditors, and that θ∗ = κ if the project is financed
exclusively by small creditors, we are now in a position to derive a firm’s preferred
creditor structure conditional on its fundamental state θ. Comparing the probability
of debt default in case of a mixed creditor structure with the two benchmark cases
from Section 2.1 leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 3: If θ ≥ κ (θ < κ), a firm’s weakly dominant strategy is
to finance the project exclusively by a continuum of small creditors (by a
single large creditor).
Proof. To confirm the Proposition, first consider a firm with sound fundamentals
θ ≥ κ. Such a firm’s project succeeds with probability 1 if it is financed solely by a
continuum of small creditors. However, if θ ∈ [κ, θ∗) the project fails with positive
probability Pr(y ≤ y∗|θ) in case of a mixed creditor structure since the large creditor
stops lending and fundamentals are insufficient to compensate the small lenders
foreclosing on the loan. Also, financing the project by a single creditor cannot be a
dominant strategy since the project fails with positive probability Pr(y ≤ y∗|θ) if
θ ∈ [κ, 1). Thus, whenever θ ≥ κ, a firm’s weakly dominant strategy is to finance
its project by small creditors only.
On the contrary, bad fundamentals θ < κ lead to failure of the project if it is financed
exclusively by a continuum of small creditors. However, the probability of success
Pr(y ≥ y∗|θ) is strictly positive in the case with a single creditor if θ ≥ 0 and in the
case with a mixed creditor structure if θ ≥ θ∗. To compare the probability of default
under these two creditor structures, note that in both cases the project’s failure or
success depends entirely on the large creditor’s decision whenever θ ∈ [θ∗, θ∗). Since
the large creditor’s critical signal y∗ is strictly lower if he is the only lender, a firm
with a fundamental state θ < κ will favor this alternative over a mixed creditor
structure in order to minimize the probability of debt default. Thus, whenever
θ < κ, the firm’s weakly dominant strategy is to finance its project by a single large
creditor.
Hence, regardless of its liquidity, a firm attempting to minimize the probability of
inefficient liquidation is never dependent on a mixed creditor structure with a large
creditor signalling to small lenders.
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4 Signalling effects of the large creditor
In order to quantify the sigalling effects of the large creditor we compare our results
with those of the corresponding simultaneous-move game which describes the case
of unobservable investment decisions. Since it is not possible to obtain closed-form
solutions in Takeda’s model, this analysis has to be restricted to the case where the
private information of both creditor types becomes very precise (σ → 0, τ → 0).
The signalling effects of the large creditor are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1:
Fundamental thresholds for the project’s success
Large creditor is relatively
Large creditor’s informed uninformed
investment decision is (σ/τ →∞, σ → 0) (σ/τ → 0, τ → 0)
Unobservable θ∗ = κ (1− λ) θ∗ =
κ1−λ1−κ if λ > κκ if λ ≤ κ
θ∗ = 0 θ∗ = κ (1− λ)
Observable
θ
∗ = 1 θ∗ = κ (1− λ) + λ
If the large creditor is able to signal his decision, the critical levels of the funda-
mentals θ∗ (θ
∗
) are always lower (higher) than the corresponding threshold θ∗ in
the case of unobservable investment decisions. In other words, the signalling effect
of the large creditor is always positive, regardless of the relative precision of pri-
vate information. Furthermore, allowing the large creditor to signal to small lenders
dominates the outcome of the simultaneous-move game if private information is ar-
bitrarily precise. This is due to the fact that a well informed large creditor never
makes a wrong decision, i.e. he stops lending if the true state of the fundamentals
is lower than θ∗. As a consequence, the project fails if θ < θ∗ so that the upper
threshold θ
∗
becomes irrelevant for the analysis of coordination failure as τ → 0.
Since θ∗ < θ∗, irrespective of the relative precision of information, a firm facing
a very precisely informed large creditor can always reduce the incidence of ineffi-
cient liquidation by announcing the large lender’s investment decision to the small
creditors.
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As Table 1 reveals, the large creditor’s investment decision is only irrelevant if deci-
sions are observable and if the large creditor is infinitely better informed. Otherwise,
coordination failure among creditors with very precise but imperfect information de-
creases monotonically with the size of the large lender. The reason is that a more
powerful large creditor diminishes strategic uncertainty whereas fundamental uncer-
tainty is unaffected by the size of the large creditor.
Obviously, coordination failure in the unobservable action, informed large creditor
case is just as severe as in the observable action, uninformed large creditor case.
This is due to the fact that the large creditor does not ”add noise” to the game in
both cases, either because he is arbitrarily better informed or because his investment
decision is observable. Thus, the decision problem of small lenders is the same under
both circumstances: they have to estimate the true state of the fundamentals as well
as possible, given their own private signal.
5 Concluding remarks
In the case of multiple creditors financing a firms’s project a coordination problem
arises when the borrower runs into financial distress. In their seminal paper, Morris
and Shin (2004) analyzed the investment decisions of small creditors having pub-
lic information about the fundamentals and receiving a private signal concerning
these fundamentals. In our model we neglected public information. This enabled
us to concentrate on the updated beliefs of the small creditors conditional on the
large creditor’s signal without taking into account the information contained in the
prior distribution. Of course, the large creditor has a strong impact on the small
creditor’s decisions. This influence depends on three factors, the relative size of
the large creditor, the relative precision of information, and his signalling ability
depending on whether his decision is observable or not. As was shown by Takeda
(2003), the incidence of inefficient liquidation is low if the size of the large creditor
is considerable, and it is even lower if the large creditor is much better informed.
Additionally, we derived a strong signalling effect of the large creditor. If his decision
is observable, the large creditor has an even stronger influence. The two thresholds
of our sequential-move game indicating the investment behavior of small creditors
conditional on the large creditor’s signal are higher and lower, respectively, than the
corresponding threshold derived by Takeda (2003) in the simultaneous-move game.
Even a relatively uninformed large creditor, who has no valuable information to
signal, can affect the liquidation result, but only inasmuch as his size is relevant.
If size is negligible our results coincide with those derived by Takeda (2003) which
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in turn coincide with those derived by Morris and Shin (2004) in the version with
an improper prior. If the large creditor is significantly better informed than the
small creditors, a herding effect occurs. Irrespective of his size, the small creditors
imitate his behavior blindly, completely ignoring their own information. Regard-
less of its liquidity, a firm never prefers to finance the project by creditor structure
with both small and large creditors. In the case of good fundamentals the efficient
creditor structure is given by a continuum of small creditors only. In the case of
bad fundamentals, however, the efficient structure is represented by a single large
creditor.
Our results imply that a single relatively well-informed large creditor like a bank can
make the other small creditors either extremely aggressive or not aggressive at all,
depending on the private information the large creditor receives. This reintroduces
a stochastic component to the foreclosure decisions of multiple creditors. To the
extend that the success of an investment project is the mitigation of a coordination
problem among the creditors, the signalling ability of a precisely informed large
creditor is appropriate to reduce the incidence of inefficient liquidations.
15
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Rewrite equation (11) as
Pr
(
εi ≤ x∗−θ∗σ , η − στ εi > θ
∗−x∗
τ
+G−1(κ)
)
Pr
(
η − σ
τ
εi >
θ∗−x∗
τ
+G−1(κ)
) = κ .
Taking the limit as σ/τ → 0 yields
Pr
(
εi ≤ x∗−θ∗σ , η > θ
∗−x∗
τ
+G−1(κ)
)
Pr
(
η > θ
∗−x∗
τ
+G−1(κ)
) = κ .
Independence of the error terms εi und η implies
Pr
(
εi ≤ x∗−θ∗σ
)
Pr
(
η > θ
∗−x∗
τ
+G−1(κ)
)
Pr
(
η > θ
∗−x∗
τ
+G−1(κ)
) = κ ⇔
Pr
(
εi ≤ x
∗ − θ∗
σ
)
= F
(
x∗ − θ∗
σ
)
= κ
and therefore
x∗ = θ∗ + σF−1(κ) .
Inserting this equation into (9) yields
θ∗ = 1− λ− (1− λ)Pr(θ∗ + σεi > θ∗ + σF−1(κ))
= 1− λ− (1− λ)(1− F (F−1(κ)))
= 1− λ− (1− λ)(1− κ)
= κ(1− λ) .
Analogously, equation (12) can be rewritten as
Pr
(
εi ≤ x∗−θ
∗
σ
, η − σ
τ
εi ≤ θ
∗−x∗
τ
+G−1(κ)
)
Pr
(
η − σ
τ
εi ≤ θ
∗−x∗
τ
+G−1(κ)
) = κ .
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Thus, in the limiting case σ/τ → 0 results
Pr
(
εi ≤ x
∗ − θ∗
σ
)
= F
(
x∗ − θ∗
σ
)
= κ ,
so that the critical signal x∗ is given by
x∗ = θ
∗
+ σF−1(κ) .
Inserting into equation (7) yields
θ
∗
= 1− (1− λ)Pr(θ∗ + σεi > θ∗ + σF−1(κ))
= 1− (1− λ)(1− F (F−1(κ)))
= 1− (1− λ)(1− κ)
= κ(1− λ) + λ .
Using the above results, the creditors’ switching points are given by:
y∗ = κ(1− λ) + τG−1(κ)
x∗ = κ(1− λ) + σF−1(κ)
x∗ = κ(1− λ) + λ+ σF−1(κ) .
Proof of Proposition 2
Rewriting equation (11) as
Pr
(
εi ≤ x∗−θ∗σ , τση − εi > θ
∗−x∗
σ
+ τ
σ
G−1(κ)
)
Pr
(
τ
σ
η − εi > θ∗−x∗σ + τσG−1(κ)
) = κ
and taking the limit as σ/τ →∞ yields
Pr
(
εi ≤ x∗−θ∗σ , εi < x
∗−θ∗
σ
)
Pr
(
εi <
x∗−θ∗
σ
) = 1 > κ .
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Thus, the switching point of a small creditor who has observed the large creditor
rolling over the loan, tends to
x∗ → −∞ .
Hence, the probability in equation (9) is equal to 1, so that
θ∗ = 0 .
By the same token, equation (12) can be transformed to
Pr
(
εi ≤ x∗−θ
∗
σ
, τ
σ
η − εi ≤ θ
∗−x∗
σ
+ τ
σ
G−1(κ)
)
Pr
(
τ
σ
η − εi ≤ θ
∗−x∗
σ
+ τ
σ
G−1(κ)
) = κ ,
so that we get
Pr
(
εi ≤ x∗−θ
∗
σ
, εi ≥ x∗−θ
∗
σ
)
Pr
(
εi ≥ x∗−θ
∗
σ
) = 0 < κ
in the limiting case where σ/τ →∞.
Thus, the switching point of a small creditor who has observed the large creditor
foreclosing on the loan, tends to
x∗ →∞ .
Hence, the probability in equation (7) is equal to 0, so that
θ
∗
= 1 .
Finally, we can derive the large creditor’s switching point from (5):
y∗ = τG−1(κ) .
18
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